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Two Guises of the Good in Anscombe
Hlobil U.
Q1
The paper distinguishes two versions of the guise of the good in Anscombe’s Intention and raises some doubts about Francesco Orsi’s recent proposal for how these two versions hang together. While Orsi’s interpretation of the two versions are separately insightful and illuminating, Orsi’s “Anscombean argument” for connecting Anscombe’s two versions of the guise of the good is at odds with Anscombe’s own approach.
Relational Egalitarianism and Aesthetic Equality
Brecka J.
Q1
Relational egalitarians differ from distributive egalitarians by focusing on the structure of social relationships—a just society is one in which citizens relate as equals. While we can relate (un)equally along different dimensions, the importance of relating as aesthetic equals has been underexplored. Here, I offer an account of aesthetic equality in relational egalitarian terms. I argue that, to relate as aesthetic equals, individuals must be subject to the same basic normative aesthetic rules, not be stigmatized or feel inferior because of their aesthetic standing, and not suffer certain material harms because of their aesthetic standing. Thus, a society of aesthetic equals would not have oppressive beauty norms. It would also address discrimination against the aesthetically disadvantaged, or lookism. The distinctly relational egalitarian conception of aesthetic equality considered here provides a novel framework for distinguishing between permissible and unjust inequalities of bodily beauty. The relational approach also reveals that while redistribution may not be sufficient to fully address lookism, aesthetic equality can be achieved without radical revision or total rejection of our current conception of human beauty.
Moral Obligations in Conditions of Partial Compliance
Igneski V.
Q1
A Revision on Waldron’s Autonomy Defense of Moral Rights
Callaghan G.D.
Q1
The argument I defend in this paper challenges whether Waldron’s explanation of the conditions required for a moral right to satisfy its autonomy-promoting function is the best one available. It questions the suitability of Waldron’s preferred taxonomy of moral action, where acts are divided into: (1) those that are morally required; (2) those that are morally prohibited; and (3) those that are morally indifferent, advocating instead for a binary classification consisting of: (a) actions that admit of reasonable moral disagreement; and (b) actions that do not admit of reasonable moral disagreement. My claim is that the protective sphere moral rights set up in organizing the moral relations among persons is applicable only to the former category—namely, actions that admit of reasonable moral disagreement. Actions that do not admit of reasonable moral disagreement will either: (b’) not normally demand a right against interference in the first place (if the action is unquestionably permissible); or (b”) fail to admit of a right against interference at all (if the action is unquestionably impermissible). This competing explanation allows us to preserve the autonomy-promoting conception of moral rights Waldron endorses while avoiding a number of its suspect implications.
On Risk-Based Arguments for Anti-natalism
Magnusson E.
Q1
The Diagnostic Value of Freedom
Côté N.
Q1
My Children, Their Children, and Benatar’s Anti-Natalism
Overall C.
Q1
Introduction to Special Edition on “Annas on Virtue and Skill”
Hamilton R., Zheng T.
Q1
On the Practicality of Virtue Ethics
Coren D.
Q1
What’s Wrong with Speciesism
Jaquet F.
Q1
Introduction to Special Forum on “Politics and Virtue”
Hacker-Wright J.
Q1
Altruistic Eudaimonism and the Self-Absorption Objection
D’Souza J.
Q1
Species of Pluralism in Political Philosophy
Johannsen K.
Q1
Grief, Love, and Buddhist Resilience
O’Hagan E.
Q1
The Motivation of the Moral Saint
Framarin C.G.
Q1
A Process Model of Wisdom from Adversity
Ferrari M., Grossmann I., Grimm S., Staffel J.
Q1
A Consideration of Carroll’s Content Theory
Sackris D., Larsen R.R.
Q1
Virtues for the Imperfect
Nieswandt K., Hlobil U.
Q1
Exchanging for Reasons, Right and Wrong
Stein J.
Q1
No Hands, No Paradox
Sneddon A.
Q1
