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Proportionality and Purposiveness in Kant’s Highest Good
Yaretzky A.
Abstract
The task of this paper is to offer an interpretation of Kant’s notion of proportionality between morality and happiness, which is fundamental to his conception of the highest good. Kant claims that the complete good of humans as both natural and rational beings is a proportionate relation between virtue and happiness. He takes this to mean that nature is purposively designed so it accords with morality, which is only possible in a divine world where God secures this responsiveness. The paper shows various difficulties with this claim and argues that they can be resolved by a nuanced interpretation of what Kant might mean by “happiness”. This finally leads to a conception of proportionality modeled on Kant’s aesthetics.
Cohen’s Influence on Husserl’s Understanding of Kant’s Transcendental Method
Scagliusi F.
Abstract
This article argues that Husserl’s interpretation of Kant’s “regressive method” was influenced by Cohen’s account of the “transcendental method.” According to Cohen’s epistemological reading of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s transcendental method consists in explaining the “fact of science” by using a regressive procedure from this fact to its conditions of possibility. Husserl ascribes, as Cohen does, this method to Kant himself. First, he criticizes Kant for regressively deducing conditions of possibility that elude any type of intuitive fulfillment. Second, he understands Kant as a rationalist who wanted to advance intellectualism and oppose empiricism. Finally, Husserl holds that Kant’s concept of experience refers to scientific experience. All these points are central aspects of Cohen’s interpretation. Moreover, from Husserl’s own copy of Cohen’s Kant’s Theory of Experience we can observe that he had read §12 on Kant’s transcendental method. Therefore, there is a Cohenian influence on Husserl’s criticism of Kant’s method.
Transcendental Deduction and Cognitive Constructivism
Filieri L.
Abstract
In these comments, I share some remarks concerning two main points lying at the core of Gava’s book Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics: Gava’s reconstruction and account of a transcendental deduction, its relation to a metaphysical deduction, and more specifically his reading of the B-Deduction. I will discuss Gava’s arguments in order to highlight the key tenets of his interpretation and raise questions related to (1) the meaning and scope of the notion of ‘transcendental’; and (2) the commitment to – and the extent of – what we might call ‘cognitive constructivism’.
Kant’s Critique of Wolff’s Dogmatic Method: Comments on Gava
Walschots M.
Abstract
In Chapter 8 of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics, one of Gabriele Gava’s aims is to argue that Kant’s critique of Wolff’s dogmatic method has two levels: one directed against Wolff’s metaphilosophical views and one attacking his actual procedures of argument. After providing a brief summary of the main claims Gava makes in Chapter 8 of his book, in this paper I argue two things. First, I argue against Gava’s claim that the two forms of dogmatism he distinguishes between are incompatible. Second, I suggest, contrary to Gava, that Kant’s critique of these two forms of dogmatism both operate on the metaphilosophical level in the sense that they both target the dogmatist’s beliefs or theory about the method they take themselves to be following.
General Logic and the Method of Metaphysical Deductions
Dalla Rosa D.
Abstract
This article focuses on the interpretation of the metaphysical deductions of the higher cognitive faculties in Gabriele Gava’s Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics. The aim is to assess the role that Kant’s general logic plays in these metaphysical deductions, the consequences for the analysis of the faculties, and the place of general logic in Gava’s overall theoretical analysis of Kant’s first Critique.
Kant’s Doctrine of Definitions and the Semantic Background of the Transcendental Analytic
Ancillotti B.
Abstract
In this paper I argue that Kant’s doctrine of definitions, as it is developed in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method (TDM) and in the lectures on logic, lays down the semantic background of the problem of the objective reality of the categories and of the solution Kant provides for it in the Transcendental Analytic. The distinction between nominal and real definitions introduces a two-dimensional element in Kant’s theory of concepts, and this, I argue, provides a compelling explanation for the assumption Kant makes in §13 that it is possible to possess a concept without knowing the conditions of its legitimate application. This view is supported by the parallels between Kant’s discussion of empirical, mathematical, and philosophical concepts in §13 and in the TDM. And, it allows clarifying the sense in which the arguments that prove the objective reality of the categories are, at the same time, counterfactual reflections that give us (incomplete) insight into their real definitions.
How to Become a Good Artist – Kant on Humaniora and the ‘Propaedeutic for All Beautiful Art’
Berger L.
Abstract
In § 60 of the Critique of Judgment, entitled ‘On the doctrine of method of taste,’ Kant suggests that the study of so-called humaniora (ancient Roman and Greek literature) will help one to become a good artist. I will argue that a proper, namely emotional, engagement with humaniora will further the two components of humanity in ourselves: the feeling of sympathy and the ability to communicate feelings. I will discuss two options of how a strengthening of these two components might contribute to the creation of good artworks: it will help one to create artworks that arouse the universal communicable pleasure in the beautiful, or it will help one to create artworks that arouse sympathetic feelings. Siding with the latter option, I will argue that emotions can contribute to the enlivening of aesthetic ideas and, thus, to good art.
Virtue, Wide Duties, and Casuistry. On why there is a Doctrine of Method in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue
Schmidt E.E.
Abstract
This paper deals primarily with the Doctrine of Method (DM) of Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue. First, I present an overview of the DM (1.1) and an explanation of how it is possible to teach virtue (1.2). Second, I address the following issues: Why is a DM necessary at all (2.1)? How does the DM relate to what Kant calls casuistry (2.2)? I will argue that wide duties have two essential characteristics: They command the right kind of moral motivation in terms of a moral maxim, and they allow for latitude. The fact that wide duties command the right kind of motivation leads to the DM; the latitude of wide duties, however, leads to casuistry. To unfold this interpretation, it must also be shown that both imperfect and perfect duties are wide duties.
Kant’s Theory of the Highest Good Revisited. New Essays on an Architectonic Concept
Filieri L., Perulli L.
Kantian vs. Platonic: The Ambiguity of Schopenhauer’s Notion of Ideas Explained via Its Origins
Sattar A.
AbstractThe ‘Platonic Ideas’ in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics are (merely) appearances. On the other hand, as the immediate objecthood of the will, they are the essences of species and the only object of true aesthetic cognition, which leads beyond mere appearance. To explain this apparent incongruence, I offer an analysis of Schopenhauer’s early metaphysics (1809–1814), and its transformation into the metaphysics of will, fleshing out the several and divergent concepts of (Platonic) ‘idea’. Specifically, first, as part of his religious and neo-Platonic early philosophy; second, in the context of his ‘true criticism’ in the spirit of Kantian transcendental philosophy; third, as identical to the thing in itself as part of the metaphysics of will, heavily influenced by Kant’s notion(s) of ideas fromCRandCJ. Explaining Schopenhauer’s mature notion of Platonic Ideas genetically as a set of homonymic notions helps us better explain its divergent meanings inWWR.
Forgiveness as an Approach to the History of Philosophy
Gazit Y.
Abstract
In the past, Robert Brandom’s philosophy has provided fruitful grounds for the development of an approach to the history of philosophy. In A Spirit of Trust (2019), however, this approach takes a new form; one that corresponds to a shift of focus in Brandom’s philosophy, from his earlier inferentialism to its later developments in the thesis of rational recollection. This article aims to elucidate and explicate this new approach, which Brandom refers to as forgiveness. By looking into the thesis of rational recollection, the article examines the back-looking attitude that Brandom argues for and how it can be applied to past philosophy. To better understand the novelty of this approach as forgiveness, the article considers other names that Brandom ascribes to this process, which interestingly correspond to different genres in the historiography of philosophy. Lastly, the article discusses whether such a forgiving approach leaves room for criticism and mistakes.
Giorgi Lebanidze: Hegel’s Transcendental Ontology
Ganzinger F.
A Relational Account of Moral Normativity: The Neo-Kantian Notion of We-Subject
Redaelli R.
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to provide a relational explanation of the sources of moral normativity, within a Neo-Kantian framework. To this purpose, the key notions employed are those of we-society and stance-taking, developed by Neo-Kantian philosopher Heinrich Rickert. Specifically, by resorting to such notions, the paper attempts to overcome two limits ascribed to the theory of moral normativity of Ch. Korsgaard: namely W. Smith’s objection of solipsism and S. Crowell’s problem of non-deliberate action, whereby Ch. Korsgaard’s identification of the source of normativity in reflection would lead her theory to a form of solipsism and to failing to explain actions based on so-called ‘mindless coping’. In tackling these objections, the paper outlines a Rickertian inspired theory, according to which the sources of moral normativity can be explained on the basis of the heterological I-You relationship, which is the foundation of the we-society intended as a set of values, patterns of expectations, tacit consents, and procedural knowledge.
The ScientificWeltanschauung: (Anti-)Naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy
Spiegel T.J.
AbstractDifferent forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” InWilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1–40. Ridgeview Publishing), aWeltanschauung(Loewer, B. 2001. “From Physics to Physicalism.” InPhysicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010.Physicalism. Routledge), or even a “philosophical ideology” (Kim, J. 2003. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.”Journal of Philosophical Research28: 83–98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea – naturalism being a worldview – presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung,Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism’s status as a worldview.
Edgar Wind on Experiment and Metaphysics
Falkenburg B.
AbstractThe paper presents a detailed interpretation of Edgar Wind’sExperiment and Metaphysics(1934), a unique work on the philosophy of physics which broke with the Neo-Kantian tradition under the influence of American pragmatism. Taking up Cassirer’s interpretation of physics, Wind develops a holistic theory of the experiment and a constructivist account of empirical facts. Based on the concept of embodiment which plays a key role in Wind’s later writings on art history, he argues, however, that the outcomes of measurements are contingent. He then proposes an anti-Kantian conception of a metaphysics of nature. For him, nature is an unknown totality which manifests itself in discrepancies between theories and experiment, and hence the theory formation of physics can increasingly approximate the structure of nature. It is shown that this view is ambiguous between a transcendental, metaphysical realism in Kant’s sense and an internal realism in Putnam’s sense. Wind’s central claim is that twentieth century physics offers new options for resolving Kant’s cosmological antinomies. In particular, he connected quantum indeterminism with the possibility of human freedom, a connection that Cassirer sharply opposed.
Orientation, Indexicality, and Comparisons
von Sass H.
AbstractIn his 1786 essay, What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?, Kant characterizes the business of reasoning by referring to the use of the spatial orientations ‘right’ and ‘left’; he, then, extents his analysis to mathematical and logical ways of orientation. The following paper will start off by analyzing the Kantian standard account of orientation to, eventually, amend that account by deepening and correcting it in three respects: the indexical character of orientation that is due to the particular standpoint of the subject who is oriented by a particular cluster of available reference points; the twofold comparative procedure of orientation in which a situation is assessed by virtue of a practically justified and indexically structured net of orientation; and the receptive modes of orientation, mirroring the ‘existential’ fact that the subject is already oriented to a situation by established institutions. The paper ends in briefly considering the pitfalls and benefits of being disoriented.
