Найдено 99
Ничего не найдено
Negative-Weight Single-Source Shortest Paths in Near-Linear Time
Bernstein A., Nanongkai D., Wulff-Nilsen C.
Q1
In the single-source shortest paths problem, the goal is to compute the shortest path tree from a designated source vertex in a weighted, directed graph. We present the first near-linear time algorithm for the problem that can also handle negative edge-weights; the runtime is
O
(
m
log
8
(
n
)
log
W
)
.
In contrast to all recent developments that rely on sophisticated continuous optimization methods and dynamic algorithms, our algorithm is simple: it requires only a simple graph decomposition and elementary combinatorial tools. In fact, ours is the first combinatorial algorithm for negative-weight single-source shortest paths to break through the classic
O
~
(
m
n
log
W
)
bound from over three decades ago (Gabow and Tarjan, SICOMP’89.)
Justice, Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion at UbiComp/ISWC: Best Practices for Accessible and Equitable Computing Conferences
Rode J.A., Castro L.A., Viswanath V., Valdez Gastelum M.C., Mashhadi A., Tentori M., Van Laerhoven K., Weibel N.
The EU AI Act and the Wager on Trustworthy AI
Bellogín A., Grau O., Larsson S., Schimpf G., Sengupta B., Solmaz G.
Q1
As the impact of AI is difficult to assess by a single group, policymakers should prioritize societal and environmental well being and seek advice from interdisciplinary groups focusing on ethical aspects, responsibility, and transparency in the development of algorithms.
Pitfalls in Machine Learning for Computer Security
Arp D., Quiring E., Pendlebury F., Warnecke A., Pierazzi F., Wressnegger C., Cavallaro L., Rieck K.
Q1
With the growing processing power of computing systems and the increasing availability of massive datasets, machine learning algorithms have led to major breakthroughs in many different areas. This development has influenced computer security, spawning a series of work on learning-based security systems, such as for malware detection, vulnerability discovery, and binary code analysis. Despite great potential, machine learning in security is prone to subtle pitfalls that undermine its performance and render learning-based systems potentially unsuitable for security tasks and practical deployment.
In this paper, we look at this problem with critical eyes. First, we identify common pitfalls in the design, implementation, and evaluation of learning-based security systems. We conduct a study of 30 papers from top-tier security conferences within the past 10 years, confirming that these pitfalls are widespread in the current security literature. In an empirical analysis, we further demonstrate how individual pitfalls can lead to unrealistic performance and interpretations, obstructing the understanding of the security problem at hand. As a remedy, we propose actionable recommendations to support researchers in avoiding or mitigating the pitfalls where possible. Furthermore, we identify open problems when applying machine learning in security and provide directions for further research.
A Security Model for Web-Based Communication
Tehrani P.F., Osterweil E., Schmidt T.C., Wählisch M.
Q1
Web access involves various protocols to resolve domain names to IP addresses, establish data exchange channels with Web servers, and to authenticate communication partners. Each protocol has its own set of requirements and security measures. In addition to technical features, operating the Web also introduces organizational and political aspects which are important to consider when deploying a secure basis for Web-based communication.
In this paper, we propose an algorithmic security model based on the widely deployed technologies DNS(SEC) and Web PKI to cover the three dimensions
identification
,
resolution
, and
transaction
. Our model enables quantification and qualification of the security assurance provided by an online service provider. To verify the applicability of our model, we investigate the online presence of
Alerting Authorities
in the U.S., selected
German Emergency Service
providers, and
UN member states
. We observe partially enhanced security relative to global Internet trends, yet find cause for concern as only about 6% of unique hosts cater to secure resolution. About 46% of investigated organizations use shared certificates with 1% of all organizations having no or invalid certificates. Two thirds of organizations are not uniquely identifiable and as such lack the basic requirement of trustworthy communication.
A Brief History of Blockchain Interoperability
Belchior R., Süßenguth J., Feng Q., Hardjono T., Vasconcelos A., Correia M.
Requirements Engineering in Latin America: The Case of the WER
Quintanilla Portugal R.L., Antonelli L., Marczak S., Hadad G.D., Castro J., Leite J.C.
Q1
The Internet of Batteryless Things
Ahmed S., Islam B., Yildirim K.S., Zimmerling M., Pawełczak P., Alizai M.H., Lucia B., Mottola L., Sorber J., Hester J.
On Specifying for Trustworthiness
Abeywickrama D.B., Bennaceur A., Chance G., Demiris Y., Kordoni A., Levine M., Moffat L., Moreau L., Mousavi M.R., Nuseibeh B., Ramamoorthy S., Ringert J.O., Wilson J., Windsor S., Eder K.
