Kajiyama has argued that the basis for the concept of jāti (false rejoinder) as described in the Nyāyasūtra is the concept xiang ying (相応) as found in the Fangbian xin lun (方便心論). Kajiyama has also shown that the sophistic arguments called xiang ying are very similar to the prasaṅga arguments of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka school. It thus seems worthwhile to investigate how later Mādhyamika philosophers treated the concept of jāti that originally appeared as the result of the Nyāyasūtra’s criticism of the concept xiang ying and was later accepted by Buddhist logicians such as Dignāga. This paper shows that there were two entirely opposite Mādhyamika positions regarding the concept of jāti. In order to demonstrate this difference, this paper examines in detail statements about jātis that appear in various treatises, especially two works by Bhāviveka and three works by Candrakīrti. As the result, it becomes clear that the differences in the two positions correspond essentially to the differences in how Dignāgaʼs logic was evaluated by the so-called Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika within the Madhyamaka school.

The Vibhaṅga Mūlaṭīkā, attributed to Ānanda, is a sub-commentary of one of the seven books of the Pāli Abhidhamma-piṭaka, the Vibhaṅga, and the direct commentary of its commentary, Buddhaghosa’s Sammohavinodanī. In the section on the satipaṭṭhāna method, Ānanda proposes exegetical strategies to solve some seeming contradiction between Buddhaghosa’s interpretation of the Vibhaṅga and the Sutta’s framework that the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga refers to. An examination of exemplary passages from the Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga of the Vibhaṅga Mūlaṭīkā will shed light upon the originality of Ānanda’s thought and its influence on Dhammapāla’s commentaries.

The theory of negation developed in the grammatical-philosophical system of later Vyākaraṇa remains almost entirely unstudied, despite its close links with the (widely studied) approaches to negation found in other philosophical schools such as Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, and despite its consequent importance for a comprehensive understanding of the theory of negation in ancient India. In this paper we present an edition, translation and commentary of the relevant sections of Nāgeśa’s Paramalaghumañjūṣā, a concise presentation by the final authority of the Pāṇinian tradition, together with an explanatory introduction outlining the grammarians’ theory of negation and its relations particularly with the Nyāya theory of negation.

This paper aims to offer a preliminary explication of the role of and the relation between mental states, action, and blame in Medhātithi’s commentary on the most influential juridical text of the Sanskrit world – the jurisprudential text attributed to Manu. In defining what it means to act and what constitutes engaging in intentional and unintentional action, this paper makes three claims. First, enjoined actions (e.g., sacrifices) require particular mental states to be performed. Notwithstanding the role of mental states in enjoined actions, actions lacking the corresponding mental states can be blameworthy. In fact, unintentional actions (including also actions done intentionally, but under a description that foregoes what renders the conduct sanctionable) can indeed constitute blameworthy conduct. Second, although unintentional action still meets the threshold for constituting blameworthy conduct, mental states generally play an important role regarding the degree of blame assignable to a person. Third, there are several possible rules that make sense of the seemingly inconsistent use and impact of intention throughout Manu’s Code of Laws as Medhātithi’s commentary shows. The paper also sheds light on the relation between intentions and desires according to Medhātithi.

The present paper is about three concepts which are crucially involved in Gaṅgeśa's interpretation of a Mīmāṃsā argument against the well-known design inference of the existence of God in Nyāya, namely the concepts “cognition” (jñāna), “certitude” (niścaya) and “doubt” (saṃśaya). According to Maheśa Chandra, the author of the Navya-Nyāya manual Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and its Technical Terms, certitude and doubt are the two varieties of cognition. He illustrates the verbal expression of certitudes by means of declaratives and the verbal expression of doubts by means of interrogatives (functioning as polar or alternative questions). He notes also that different credence levels might be associated with the alternatives involved in a speaker’s doubt. A biassed question in the form of a tag interrogative might be an appropriate way to express such a doubt. In Western logic the idea to treat declaratives and interrogatives on a par, which is anticipated by the Navya-Naiyāyikas' use of the unifying concept of “cognition”, goes back to Frege’s distinction between the semantic content (the “thought”) of a sentence and its force and it was recently elaborated by Ciardelli, Farkas, Groenendijk, Roelofsen et al., the founders of a new branch in logic called “inquisitive logic”. In the present paper we will discuss Maheśa Chandra's succinct exposition of the Navya-Naiyāyikas' innovative approach from the perspective of this type of logic. As an offshoot of our analysis we will try to elucidate Gaṅgeśa's apologetic concerns about the well-known design inference of the existence of God in Nyāya and its liability to be vitiated by a dubious upādhi.

This paper suggests that the classic of Indian theology, the Nyāya-kusumâñjali is in fact two texts: an earlier treatise in 65 ślokas, and Udayana’s (mostly prose) commentary on it. Internal evidence consists in: (a) the ślokas read as a continuous text; (b) there are extremely long prose passages without verses; (c) Udayana does not comment on his own verses, only on the ślokas; (d) the basic plan of the two texts are markedly different; (e) different content of some chapters: ch. 1 about karma vs. rituals to reach heaven, ch. 2 about creation vs. eternality of sound, and in ch. 5 Udayana doubles the arguments for God; (f) Udayana deals extensively with atoms and yogic perception and rejects the concept of śakti, in contrast to the verses; (g) there are a few manifest disagreements (on creatio continua and the sacredness of god-images). External evidence for the thesis: (a) there are mss. of the verses only; (b) there are many commentaries on the verses only; (c) these commentators—with a single exception—do not seem to take Udayana for the author of the verses; (d) the first commentary on Udayana names his own work a subcommentary; (e) in his other works, it is atypical of Udayana to insert ślokas in his text; (f) a legend of the Bhāduṙī Brahmins stating that Udayana “received” the Kusumâñjali.

This article concentrates on certain beliefs that many Indian thinkers implicitly accepted and that show up in an analysis of reasoned arguments they presented. These beliefs concerned the relationship between language and reality. For Brahmanical thinkers, who owed their privileged position in society in great part to their mastery of texts — the Veda — that were deemed to be directly connected to reality, this relationship between language and reality was a matter of course. For reasons of their own, Buddhist thinkers had come to think that the world of our experience is largely determined by language. This shared belief, which most often though not always remained implicit, found its way into certain arguments. These arguments remain unintelligible without an awareness of the underlying belief.

This paper explores the coexistence of more apologetic and of more systematic considerations in the Āpta-mīmāṁsā (ĀMī), Investigation on authority, of the Jain author Samantabhadra (530–590). First, this treatise offers a relevant case study to investigate the transition from a conception in which the reliability criterion of an authoritative discourse is the authoritative character of its utterer, to a conception in which the criteria of validity and soundness of the discourse itself are foremost. Second, Samantabhadra is one of the first authors to undertake to logically prove the omniscience of the Jain teachers. And third, he links these questions to the celebrated Jain epistemological theory of non-one-sidedness.

This paper is taken from a long section of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi by Gaṅgeśa that is devoted to proving the existence of—to use an inadequate word—“God” in a somewhat minimalist sense. The īśvara, the “Lord,” is for Gaṅgeśa, following Nyāya predecessors, a divine agent, a self, responsible for much, not all, of the order in the world. Unseen Force, adṛṣṭa, which is in effect karman made by human action, is also a powerful agent as well as things’ intrinsic natures. Moreover, ordinary selves, atoms, ether, and universals are uncreated. But the īśvara brings about just desert in reincarnation in actualizing Unseen Force, and is responsible for a broad swathe of what some see as accidental arrangements as well as the forming of the macro elements from eternal, naturally disjoined atoms. Thus the cosmos in its general existence and structure is viewed in Nyāya as the work of the Lord. Gaṅgeśa’s argument runs: Earth and the like [a (pakṣa) = earth and the like (kṣity-ādi)] have a conscious agent as a cause [S (sādhya) = having an agential cause (sakartṛkatva) (Sa)], since they are effects [H (sādhana) = being an effect [(kāryatva) (Ha)], like a pot [b (dṛṣṭānta) = a pot (Hb,Sb)]. And so the vyāpti rule is: [H → S (vyāpti)] Whatever is an effect has an agential cause. For earth and the like, it is reasoned that only an omniscient īśvara could be that cause. The argument was a target of Buddhists who pointed to counterexamples such as growing grass. Growing grass exhibits the prover property, being-an-effect, but not the property to be proved, having-an-agential-cause. The long section is dominated by Gaṅgeśa’s rebutting this and other potential defeaters, in particular, the upādhi, having-a-living-body (God does not have a living body but all the agential causes with which we are familiar do), along with a counterinference (sat-pratipakṣa), Ia & (x)(Ix → ¬Sx), where I = not-produced-by-an-agent-with-a-body.

In the “Chapter on the Benefits to the Performer of the Dharma” (dharmabhāṇakānuśaṁsāparivartaḥ) in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (Lotus Sūtra), the Buddha proclaims the many remarkable transformations that will take place in the six sense faculties of the performer of the dharma (dharmabhāṇaka). An analysis of this chapter clarifies both the sūtra’s normative vision for the performance of the dharmabhāṇaka who announces his sensory enhancements and the nature of the bodily transformations that the sūtra promises to enact upon him as a consequence of his performance. This paper demonstrates that the performed sūtra enacts the interdependent rituals of abhi⋅eka and darśan through verbal practices of impersonation, self-praise, and ontological transformation. In the process, it sheds new light on the self-referentiality of some Mahāyāna sūtras as a form of performed and performative utterance that aims to transform both speakers and listeners. As in other traditions of sensory-somatic transformation through verbal impersonation in ancient South Asia, the ritual-dramatic utterance of the sūtra engenders a manifestation of presence that takes shape in the complex embodied intersections among the “original” speaker (in this case, the Buddha), the performer, and the audience.

This essays considers the hypothesis that Indian epistemology does not clearly recognize, let alone emphasize, an intellectual faculty that apprehends intelligible things, such as essences or “truths of reason,” or elevate knowledge of such things to a status higher than that of sense perception. Evidence for this hypothesis from various sources, including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Buddhist logic-epistemological writings, is examined. Special attention is given to a passage from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, Pratyakṣasūtra chapter, where he argues that the senses directly perceive existence. Kumārila’s view is contrasted to Plato’s, in the Theaetetus, that existence is the object, not of the senses, but the soul (psychē).

This special issue of Journal of Indian Philosophy results from a thematic session on “Logic in the Religions of South Asia”, a separate section of the 2nd World Congress on Logic and Religion (held at the University of Warsaw, Poland, June 18–22 June, 2017). The papers address questions, discussed in philosophical thought in classical India, such as how religious practice could shape philosophical reflection on the relation between language and reality, whether there are necessary truths and whether a priori knowledge is possible, the nature of some arguments for the existence of God, especially the argument from the causality of the universe, the problem of the validity of religious authority, the relation between logic and religious belief as well as language-related topics such as a theory of interrogatives expressing doubts and of declaratives expressing certitudes, both regarded as the verbal expression of cognitions.

Theravada Buddhist sermons in palm-leaf manuscript collections in South and Southeast Asia are frequently bilingual, including portions in the classical language of Pali and a local vernacular, such as Burmese, Sinhala, or Thai. These bilingual sermons prove to be ideal subjects for exploring how Buddhist scriptures function as kinetic, interactive processes of performance and reception. This paper draws on three examples of Pali-Khmer sermons composed in Cambodia between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. The three bilingual texts or “bitexts” analyzed in this article each follow a different format: rearranged phrasal gloss, selective sentence gloss, and vernacular expansion. These formats draw on the pan-Theravada technology of the bitext to create a dynamic oscillation between Pali and Khmer passages, amplifying patterns established by differential practices of listening and recitation. The key medium in this process is language, which serves as a fluid intermediary that makes the relational activity of scripture possible.

Many issues are raised by thinking about “The Idea of Text in Buddhism.” This paper concentrates on scriptures of Indian Buddhism, and considers some of the questions raised or inspired by the papers presented at the 2019 Jerusalem conference on “The Idea of Text in Buddhism.” Consideration is given among other topics to multilingualism, in which context a comparison is offered with the traditions of the Targums in Jewish literature.

The reliefs carved on the vedikā of the Bharhut stūpa in the Satna District of Madhya Pradesh are some of the earliest artworks extant in India to articulate the Buddha’s life stories and the essence of his teaching in a complex visual form. This article proposes that the reliefs from Bharhut depicting episodes from Śākyamuni’s life and jātakas were informed by narrative practices established in the traditions of Buddhist recitation and performance. The inscriptions engraved on the Bharhut vedikā that function as labels for scenes, characters, and places, point to the use of specific storytelling strategies attested in oral recitation and picture scrolls that likely existed as aide-memoire.

In the Abhidharma texts, that flowers perfume sesame is used as a simile describing the mechanism of perfuming (vāsanā/paribhāvanā) in the context of meditative cultivation. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the meditative perfuming requires the co-existence of the perfumer and the perfumed. In comparison, the Yogācāra-vijñānavādins employ the same simile to explain their doctrine of the perfuming of all dharmas in ālayavijñāna, which demands the bīja as the perfumed and the manifested dharmas as the perfumer to be simultaneous. My hypothesis is that the Yogācāra idea of the perfuming of all dharmas is derived from the Abhidharma doctrine of meditative perfuming through the Sautrāntika theory of perfuming in non-concentrated (asamāhita) state. The idea of equating vāsanā and bīja probably took place under the doctrine of successive causality during the sectarian communication among the Sarvāstivādins, the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas, and the early Mahāyānists. The Vaibhāṣika principle of simultaneous perfuming, which requires that the perfumed must co-exist with the perfumer, makes it possible in the Yogācāra-vijñānavāda that a bīja in ālayavijñāna is simultaneous with its manifestation.

As Buddhist externalists, both Saṅghabhadra and Śubhagupta claim the existence of an external object on the basis of atomism. In this paper, I will show the interrelationship between Saṅghabhadra’s and Śubhagupta’s atomic theories. Regarding the ontological status of the aggregation of atoms, both of them agree on a Vaibhāṣika principle that the aggregation of atoms, as a real substance, can serve as an object-support (ālambana) of cognition. Based on this principle, their similarities can be further explicated from three aspects. Regarding epistemology, Śubhagupta differs from Saṅghabhadra on the cognitive process of the awareness of something blue. For Saṅghabhadra, a gross object is grasped by non-conceptual sensory consciousness because it is a real entity aggregated by atoms. Through the function of vitarka of sensory consciousness, an object with its essential nature, i.e., the colour blue, is distinguished from other entities. Then, it is known as the notion ‘blue’, which is a mere provisional existence, through the conceptual thought of mental consciousness. However, for Śubhagupta, a coarse object such as something blue is only a mental error of conceptual construction.

The Saṁhitā Upaniṣad [SU] is a little-known Vedic text that presents ‘typical’ Upaniṣadic teachings on the truth of identity alongside seemingly out-of-place descriptions of rites used to protect oneself against enemies and even against death. The difference between these contents is striking, but what it has to tell us about the SU’s main concerns is vulnerable to historical and text critical methods that rely on structure, style, and linguistic archaism to divide texts into discrete strata. What if the modern text critical practice of individually identifying and classifying textual contents obscures the use and meaning of the word saṁhitā in the SU? Is it possible that the SU’s diverse contents are intrinsically related? This article explores these questions through a close examination of a sequence of passages illustrating the contrast that has led previous scholars to see the SU as miscellaneous in character and lacking internal coherence. Through this examination, I identify a wider context for saṁhitā in the specific relationship the SU depicts between the person (puruṣa) and speech (vāc). I argue that the SU’s treatment of saṁhitā draws upon an understanding of recitation in the perspective of one’s vulnerability and the dynamics involved in developments of personhood. These findings allow the SU to emerge as an intriguing and coherent text that merits closer examination and establishes a promising approach for the study of the R̥gvedic Āraṇyakas.

The Yogārṇava (‘the ocean of yoga’) is a Sanskrit compendium on yoga that has not been published, translated or even mentioned in secondary literature on yoga. Citations attributed to it occur in several premodern commentaries and compendiums on yoga, and a few published library catalogues report manuscripts of a work on yoga called the Yogārṇava. This article presents the results of the first academic study of the text. It has attempted to answer basic questions, such as the work’s provenance and textual sources. The authors then discuss the importance of the Yogārṇava within the broader history of yoga based on their identification of citations and parallel verses in other Sanskrit texts and a detailed analysis of the Yogārṇava’s content.

This essay seeks to characterize one of the leading ideas in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī, the fundamental role that the idea of complexity plays in its theory of knowledge. The appeal to the causally complex nature of any event of valid awareness is framed as a repudiation of the lean ontology and epistemology of the Buddhist theorists working in the tradition of Dharmakīrti; for Jayanta, this theoretical minimalism led inevitably to the inadmissible claim of the irreality of the world outside of consciousness. In countering this Buddhist position, Jayanta adopts some of his opponents’ characteristic terminology, most notably in his use of sāmagrī, “causal complex” itself. He resituates this borrowed vocabulary within a strong appeal to the theory of the kārakas or the semantic roles detailed by grammarians since the time of Pāṇini. Possibly borrowing this sāmagrī-kāraka amalgam from the Buddhist grammarian-epistemologist Jinendrabuddhi, Jayanta uses it as a point of departure for a sustained attack on the views of Dharmottara, who Jayanta understood as offering the most advanced and most problematic Buddhist philosophical position available in his time and place.

Pali classical grammars reflect a specific idea of what Pali Buddhist texts are. According to this traditional idea, texts are mainly conceived as sound and therefore the initial portions of every grammar deal with sound and sound ligature or sandhi. Sandhi in Pali does not work as systematically as it does in Sanskrit and therefore Pali grammarians have struggled with the optionality of many of their rules on sound ligature. Unlike modern linguists, however, they identify certain patterns of fixed or frozen sandhis that are often associated to the formulas of Pali prose. This paper focuses on these specific frozen sandhis in Pali prose and their connection to the nature of Pali literature broadly. The main working hypothesis is the following: in the same way that certain frozen sandhis in verse obey metrical patterns, frozen sandhis in prose suggest that Pali speech-sounds are subordinated to formulaic rhythmic structures.

Deeply rooted in the Vedic tradition, animal sacrifice is a controversial issue associated with a larger discourse of violence and non-violence in South Asia. Most existent studies on Vedic killing focus on the polemics of ritual violence in six schools of Indian philosophy. However, insufficient attention has been paid to killing in Dharmaśāstric literature, the killing that is an indispensable element of a Vedic householder’s life. To fill in the gap, this paper analyzes the animal sacrifice in the Manubhāṣya of Medhātithi, perhaps the most influential exegesis of the Mānavadharmaśāstra. As an important but understudied Dharmaśāstric exegesis, the Manubhāṣya provides insights on how dharmaśāstrins as protagonists of Vedic tradition understand ritual killing while dialoguing with other traditions in the complex religious landscape of the ninth century Kashmir. By investigating Medhātithi’s commentary on Mānavadharmaśāstra 5.22–56, this paper interrogates how Medhatithi interprets sacrificial killing, and how his interpretation assists to buttress the authority of the Vedic tradition represented by the root text. I argue that Medhātithi’s exegesis of killing serves as apologetics that re-establishes the Vedic sacrificial tradition, which is challenged by popular non-Vedic practices. This study intends to contribute to a better understanding of animal sacrifice situated at the intersection of Vedic, Purānic and Tantric strands, and the way in which Dharmaśāstric exegesis as apologetics engages in the negotiation of violence.

The logical analysis of Nāgārjuna’s (c. 200 CE) catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma or four-corners) has remained a heated topic for logicians in Western academia for nearly a century. At the heart of the catuṣkoṭi, the four corners’ formalization typically appears as: A, Not A (¬A), Both (A &¬A), and Neither (¬[A∨¬A]). The pulse of the controversy is the repetition of negations (¬) in the catuṣkoṭi. Westerhoff argues that Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā uses two different negations: paryudāsa (nominal or implicative negation) and prasajya-pratiṣedha (verbal or non-implicative negation). This paper builds off Westerhoff’s account and presents some subtleties of Nāgārjuna’s use of these negations regarding their scope. This is achieved through an analysis of the Sanskrit and Tibetan Madhyamaka commentarial tradition and through a grammatical analysis of Nāgārjuna’s use of na (not) and a(n)- (non-) within a diverse variety of the catuṣkoṭi within the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.