Abstract This article seeks to unpack China’s green industrial policy and explore its implications for world trade law. It argues that, first, central to China’s achievements in renewable energy is the role of state-level centralized green industrial policy. Second, China’s approach to renewable energy features a pragmatic attitude of subordinating climate commitment to economic development prerogatives. China’s pro-growth mentality has also shaped the international posture of China on climate change. Third, China’s domination in green technology has raised important policy questions for world trade law. In response to China’s green industrial policy, other countries are likely to enforce trade defense measures more aggressively against China and launch their own green industrial policy as a critical part of the re-balancing effort.

AbstractRegulators in the US, EU and China embarked on several episodes of reforms to improve the accountability of credit rating agencies after the Financial Crisis 2007–2008. The US reform implemented a new civil liability provision, although the new regime remains weak, largely caused by the regulator’s inability in taking a tough liability approach on powerful credit rating agencies but giving in to the economic demands of the country. In contrast, the EU’s provision is much more balanced; however, it left too much leeway to the national laws’ interpretation. The parameters of civil liability under the Chinese law largely coincide with the Western laws, although with a unique robustness by reversing the burden of proof. The recent reforms improved the accountability of credit rating agencies to some extent, nonetheless, more work is needed to give effect to these regulatory reforms with further collaboration. This paper critically analyses the robustness of the Chinese civil liability regime with the reversed burden of proof, which arguably sits uncomfortably with the Western laws. It calls for an improvement of the current civil liability regime in the US and China by adopting the EU model, which is more feasible to balance the responsibilities of key players in the financial market.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Chinese vision of global governance and the implications that it poses for the established international economic order. This has been expressed through Chinese-led international initiatives such as the Belt and the Road Initiative (BRI) as well as the Chinese economic model of ‘Neo-Confucian state capitalism’ (Ho, 2008), which have created a paradigm for the developing world to follow. While the BRI had previously been perceived as a largely abstract concept, it has become an integral part of the Chinese vision of an interconnected world order, which has come at a time when China is seeking to redefine its’ global role. In addition, the paper will also explore how the Chinese vision for global governance has presented a notable challenge to the established international economic order by presenting the Chinese vision as an alternative to the established system as well as questioning many of the norms that have underpinned the liberal rules-based order. As a result, the Chinese vision for global order has become one of the most pressing questions for the established economic order as well as offering a window into China’s perception of its global role and identity, which it seeks to promote to a wider context.

China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping pursues a “whole-nation” approach to acquire strategic technology from advanced nations. It means the Chinese state uses all resources at its disposal to tap and steer Chinese citizens and members of the Chinese diaspora to use their expertise, money, and network to acquire strategic technology from abroad. This article demonstrates that this approach has three main defining features. The first is to attract foreign technology firms to China, where they are incentivized or coerced into sharing technologies with Chinese companies, especially state-owned enterprises. The second is to acquire foreign technology firms abroad through mergers and acquisitions, portfolio investment, loans, foreign venture capital firms, and greenfield investment. The third is to recruit global technology talents, especially by enticing scientists from advanced countries to relocate to China to carry out research for the benefit of Chinese entities. This paper concludes that while the “whole-nation” approach has delivered significant results, it is reaching the limit of what it can deliver due mainly to backlashes from the governments and companies in Western countries.

AbstractDespite what many saw as a détente in US–China relations as presidents Biden and Xi met at the G20 Summit in November 2022, both countries have continued to develop and deploy sanctions against one another. Among the most recent actions by the US is the continued use of export controls, particularly to limit China’s access to advanced computing chips. Meanwhile, China has continued to use sanctions to target US firms, recently in the form of a national security investigation into US chip maker, Micron, and “countermeasures” against major US arms manufacturers such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. This Article examines the range of economic sanctions that the US and China have and could deploy against one another, the lawfulness of these measures, and the likely effects of these sanctions for the future of international sanctions law. Although unilaterally imposed economic sanctions remain a deeply contested area of international law, an unintended consequence of the increasing use of sanctions by the world’s two largest economies will be to lend legitimacy and legality to their use. Although the economic costs of a US–China sanctions war would be staggering, such a war would only further entrench unilateral sanctions as a fundamental tool of national security and foreign relations. This Article describes how international law is likely to develop as a consequence of the proliferation of sanctions, arguing that, far from undermining their lawfulness, increased state practice will support a customary norm of unilaterally imposed sanctions.

AbstractThe burgeoning internet celebrity industry in China has encouraged the emergence of foreign wanghong (洋网红) as active content producers on the Chinese internet. Achieving online fame and constructing a resonant personal brand while staying within Chinese state’s permissible boundaries is a challenge for all internet influencers in China. Foreign wanghong, for their part, also have to deal with Chinese publics’ ambivalence and fluctuating perspectives on engaging foreign culture, expectations around “being foreign” and cultural nationalism fed by the currents of geopolitics. This study focuses on the performance and personas of foreign wanghong and investigates how these creators navigate the complexities of the Chinese internet to achieve substantial followings. Going beyond treating foreign participants in Chinese digital media spaces as co-opted instruments of propaganda, we take seriously foreign creators’ articulations, constructions and self-presentations of foreignness and acculturation in their efforts to earn social, cultural and economic capital in the competitive Chinese internet celebrity sphere. A mixed-method content analytical study of several hundred Douyin videos generated by 33 foreign wanghong reveals the adoption of calculated self-presentation and cross-cultural communication skills alongside a constant negotiation of an individual’s own foreignness and local constructs of the “typical foreigner”.

AbstractHow did Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang feel about Hong Kong? The existing literature has tended to see the Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong through the economic lens favoured by the British side and described the Chinese side as primarily motivated by nationalism. However, ‘nationalism’ remains a vague concept in need of further definition. This paper focuses on the Chinese side of the negotiation table. It unpacks what ‘nationalism’ meant to Deng and Zhao within the context of the negotiations by examining three interrelated components: history, identity and emotion. This paper then analyses how the Chinese side used history, identity and emotion strategically during the negotiations, focusing on the September 1982 leaders’ meetings as a case study. Adopting a constructivist lens, this paper examines historical documents against frameworks and theories from the social sciences, producing an interdisciplinary analysis of Chinese negotiation tactics. It unravels how China’s leaders used the country’s past to broadcast the Party’s stance to the people, bolster their leadership position and win the advantage over Britain in the Hong Kong negotiations.

AbstractSince the successful containment of COVID-19 in Wuhan in late March 2020, China had implemented a nationwide highly stringent and restrictive zero-COVID policy to manage the pandemic until the sudden swift away from it in early December 2022. How did the Chinese Communist Party discursively construct it as a ‘normal’ and legitimate policy? Using interpretivism and poststructuralist political theory, this paper examines how Chinese political elites constructed a discourse of danger for the COVID pandemic, with the dominant discursive narratives full of xenophobic and nationalist languages. The discourse framed ‘foreigners’ as ‘threats’ to Chinese people’s health, advocated that China should rely on home-made vaccines and medicines and, more importantly, argued that the Chinese Communist rule demonstrates ‘institutional superiority’ over Western governance. This xenophobic and nationalist discourse has lingered on after the dismantling of the zero-COVID policy. There are grounds for us to concern whether China is seeking self-reliance rather than integrating itself with the world. A Chinese decoupling from the world—a nationalist self-reliance policy similar with that in the Mao era—is not unthinkable.

AbstractRussia’s foreign policy concept, last updated in 2023, envisioned economic and political cooperation with countries of the Asia-Pacific as important for advancing Russia’s agenda as a global power and emphasised the need to improve connectivity across Eurasia. This article applies a novel theoretical framework for analysing Russia’s approach to connectivity in Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Drawing from policy documents and secondary sources, the article identifies three different geographical spaces targeted by Russian connectivity policy: East of the Russian Federation, post-Soviet Central Asia, and Greater Eurasia. It is argued that the attempts to improve the cooperative connectivity of the Russian Far East have been half-hearted. In contrast, the attempt to retain and rebuild connectivity within the post-Soviet space has followed the logics of competition, containment, and coercion. Moreover, by promoting the Greater Eurasian Partnership, Russia has sought to keep status equality with China against the backdrop of the latter’s Belt and Road Initiative. The article maintains that Russia is a connectivity actor of its own right, even if there is a major gap between its connectivity strategy and its implementation. It further suggests that the war in Ukraine has accelerated the trend towards coercion and disconnectivity.

AbstractGovernance is essentially a dynamic mechanism to promote collective action for the common good. The Chinese concept of the public/common (gōnggòng) and its political philosophy of Grand Union governance provide an alternative perspective for understanding such dynamics from the unit of family through institutions to the state-embedded society. Three critical arguments with interconnected elements are analysed: governance as a dynamic mechanism; review of the historical, philosophical and political legacy of Chinese governance; and proposal of a framework for governance of the Grand Union. It concludes that ‘Chinese characteristics’, such as diverse adaptations, gradual flexibility, experimental pragmatism, and polycentric balance with a strong central state are all deeply rooted in its pre-revolutionary ancien régime. In order to understand these seemingly different institutions and values, we need to revisit their original functionality of governing for the common good.

In the process of democratisation, it is expected that a former dominant party, at least one which abides by the rules of electoral contestation, will transition into a “catch-all” party. A catch-all party aims to attract the votes of all social cleavages and classes of voters outside what would be considered their traditional voter base. As part of the wider debate about democratisation in East Asia, this paper examines how two of East Asia’s liberal democracies—Japan and South Korea, the LDP and GNP/Saenuri, respectively, have adapted to electoral defeat and in what ways they have transitioned into catch-all parties in the Kircheimer mould. This paper finds that while intra-party reforms which could fit a catch-all model have yet to be institutionalised, data from the Comparative Manifesto Database shows that there has been a significant change in which policies both parties promote and that these are designed to appeal to a broad base of voters.

The contemporary context of higher education around the world is characterised by increasing international ‘contacts’ between higher education systems. These include increased ‘flows’ of international students, as well as rapidly growing numbers of academic collaborations through international research partnerships and transnational teaching programmes. Yet, much of the literature on international students tends to focus on how international students, and Chinese students in particular, may lack particular Western academic knowledge and values. Identifying groups as, for example, ‘Asian’, ‘Chinese’ or ‘Confucian culture heritage’ learners runs the risk of stereotyped views of international students and the desirability (for all students) of attaining only ‘Western’ academic knowledge and skills. The rise in the internationalisation of universities around the world has seen not just an increase in international student numbers, but changes to the ‘four Ps’ of higher education: policies, programmes, pedagogy and partnerships. Interestingly, the direction of student flows is beginning to change from mainly ‘east’ to ‘west’, and there is a growing interest in how these interactions can lead to more globalised and intercultural learning outcomes not only just for international students, but also for local students and staff. This article draws on theories of transculturalism, contact theory and the core principles of the UK Higher Education Academy’s Internationalising Higher Education Framework. In the context of the proliferation of universities’ internationalisation policies and the increasing cultural diversity of university staff and student populations, these theories and principles can provide a foundation for examining how increased contact between Western and Asian higher education systems can lead to learning and knowledge outcomes that can better serve individuals and organisations in the current ‘global era’. It reports research that illustrates how academics’ notions of ‘scholarship’ and ‘learning’ in both contexts are either shared or differ and points to how the common academic values can be the basis for mutual understanding, and the differences can be the source of mutual learning.

Iran-China relations have strengthened over the past decades. From an economic point of view, Iran has been an attractive destination for the Chinese businesses that are in search of new markets to expand the scope of their economic activities through trade, investment, and partnership. China has at the same time offered Iran a valuable alternative to the western economies, which gradually (and partly due to the economic sanctions imposed on Iran) decreased their level of engagement with Iran. Moreover, the relationships between China and Iran have expanded gradually to military and security cooperation. This paper will examine the development of various aspects of Sino-Iranian relations.

Kashgar, a westernmost city in the restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region bordering Central and South Asia, was paired with the southern city of Shenzhen, the most successful special economic zone for its future development. The development of Kashgar’s economy in specific and the Xinjiang in general is a part of China’s new Silk Road project which serves multi-purpose goals, such as narrowing regional disparity, reducing ethnic tensions, fighting terrorism and balancing US pivot to Asia. It is skeptical whether the Shenzhen model can be transplanted into Kashgar. The plan of developing Kashgar’s economy and establishing Kashgar special economic zone may be considered a new bottle with old wine. The development programmes in the past several decades did not address the roots of ethnic tension, including suppression of cultural autonomy and unequal distribution of the benefits and social costs of economic growth. Besides that, the success of the Shenzhen special economic zone is an exception, not a rule. It was unsuccessful in the past attempts to transfer the successful experience from Shenzhen to other special economic zones. It is skeptical whether the Shenzhen experience can be transplanted to Kashgar, whose geographical location and investment environment was much inferior.

This article argues that whilst the relationship between the Gulf Arab states and Asia is developing quickly, it will remain largely transactional for the foreseeable future. The relationship has intensified over the past 5 years and is manifest in increased trade, diplomatic traffic, foreign direct investment and energy relations. This has led some observers to argue that the Gulf Arab states will come to rely more upon Asian, rather than Western partners to provide for their security in the Gulf. The advent of the shale revolution and US energy independence has further underscored this line of analysis. The authors argue, however, that it is unlikely that the relationship between the Gulf Arab states and Asia will become strategic in the near future, as Asian leaders have shown no interest in guaranteeing Gulf security. They are content to bandwagon for as long as possible. Furthermore, the current security arrangement between Gulf Cooperation Council and Western powers, which has stood the test of time, looks likely to endure for decades. In spite of the apparent downturn in relations between Gulf Arab leaders and the West since the Arab Spring, both sides are committed to a long-term strategic relationship.

The paper tries to make an assessment of the borderland regions of China and India with a focus on Xinjiang, Tibet, Kashmir and the Indian Northeast. The paper looks at the conflict in India and China's periphery, how these conflicts have evolved with time and how they have changed their character with the passage of time, from the 1950s until the present day. After looking at some background, the paper primarily focusses on three key issues which impact on all four of the conflicts: the rise of ethnic nationalism, the impact of external forces on the conflict and the human rights situation. After making an assessment of the political situation, the paper looks at the areas of similarity and differences between the four regions. Methodologically, a bottom-up approach was taken and in-depth unstructured interviews were carried out with people from the conflict zones that the paper considers.

Research on the emerging links between the Middle East (West Asia) and other parts of Asia has grown considerably since late twentieth century. Indeed, the contributions to this special edition of the journal reflect some of the pioneering work taking place on pan-Asian relations encompassing new analysis of the Middle East’s links with the ‘East’—Central, South, and East Asia. The research in this field, looking back into history as well as forward, has grown in response to the changing dynamics of intra-Asian relations following the end of the Cold War in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union as a Eurasian land empire just a year later. The end of bipolarity encouraged new transnational relations and further regionalization of a new world order. As multi-polarity has steadily given way to a state of non-polarity, so the veil has also been lifted on the significant economic and political ties which have grown across strategic regions. In considering strategic regions, it is contended here that Asia is home to the most dynamic of these, in terms of asset accumulation, geopolitical weight, population size, and economic prowess. But it is also significant for the volatility which appears along the fault lines of historical animosity, national security tensions, modern-day rivalries, border and resources disputes, and the strengthening of communalism and divisive role of identity politics. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet control of much of Central Asia opened up new spaces for exchange in Asia, much encouraged by the exploitation of hydrocarbon reserves of the Soviet successor states in Asia (also Azerbaijan in the Caucasus). But, pan-Asian ties predate the post-Cold War transformations of the global system, and several Asian powers were able to negotiate mutually beneficial links soon after the Second World War. Although evidence of ancient pan-Asian relations is to be found in the Silk Road, systemic shift in our time is clearly leading to a perceptible transfer of the global economic balance Eastwards, which has brought with it the rise of energy-hungry Asian economies in the twenty-first century. Asian demand for energy has changed the complexion of Middle East-Asia relations, and pan-Asian relations in this context are today a reflection of the changing contours of the global political economy.

With the current interest in China (and India) proliferating within the Western Academy, this article claims that what we are witnessing today is not the rise but the “return” of China (and India). Many academics assume that the West has been the dominant civilization in the world economy in the last 500 years and that the current “rise” of China threatens to knock the West off its perch. However, this article provides an alternative take to this cherished axiom of Eurocentric world history by inverting the standard belief that the West pioneered modernity and then expanded outwards to remake the world. Thus, I argue not only that globalization preceded the rise of the West but that it was Eastern-led on the one hand and that it enabled the Western breakthrough into modernity on the other. This, in turn, rests on my claim that Chinese development stems back not to 1978 but to 960 ce as the Sung Dynasty emerged and subsequently undertook a quasi-industrial miracle. Moreover, between 1450/1492 and ca. 1830 China lay at the centre of the nascent global economy, fanning the integration process alongside other key non-Western regions such as India and West Asia/North Africa. And, while the West was the dominant player after ca. 1830 down to the turn of the third millennium, nevertheless, what we witness today is the return of China to the centre of the global economy whence it came.

I examine the views of Chinese scholars during the decade of Hu’s leadership concerning China’s diplomatic strategy with respect to the judgment of China’s national power, the orientation of China’s diplomatic goals, and the choice of China’s foreign policy. Chinese scholars increasingly judged China as an emerging major power in a multi-polarizing world. The mainstream academic attitude was that China should augment its international role. The discourse on China’s diplomatic goals experienced a skillful and tacit transition from the “keep a low profile” principle to the “harmonious world” proposal, featured by the shift in emphasis, the expansion of interpretation, and the substitution of concepts. The Chinese academia unanimously endorsed the governmental proposal of the road of peaceful development, while ambiguity can be observed in China’s more assertive responses to challenges to its “core interests”, agenda setting attempts in multilateral cooperation, and various endeavors to gain “soft power”. Underlying the transition of China’s diplomatic strategy was the materialist way of thinking concerning international relations.

This paper explores the relationship between anti-Japanese popular nationalism and China’s approach towards Japan amid Sino-Japanese political tension from 2001 to mid-2006. Among various factors that may affect the relationship, this research focuses on the interaction between the government and the public expressions of anti-Japanese nationalism in China. Throughout most of this period, Sino-Japanese political relations were seriously strained by historical, territorial and other controversial issues, which stirred up anti-Japanese sentiment in China. However, it was only between 2003 and the spring of 2005 that mass anti-Japanese protests were allowed, or at least tolerated, by the Chinese authorities and played a role in Beijing’s handling of Japan-related controversies. The paper examines China’s domestic political situation during the leadership transition from the third to fourth generation of leaders, which it claims drove the Chinese government’s lenient response to popular anti-Japanese protests and enhanced the prospects for popular nationalism to affect the government’s approach towards Japan.

China, as host of the six-party talks first convened in August 2003, has been one of the major players in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis that began in October 2002. China’s role in the talks has helped to start shaping a stable regional security architecture in Northeast Asia. Beijing’s leadership in building a new security regime in the region suggests a change on Chinese perspectives regarding its role within the broader East Asia’s regional security architecture. After years of passiveness with regards to involvement in security regime building in the region, China has evolved into an active leader seeking to shape a more institutionalized security. Despite the obstacles to building a functioning regime in Northeast Asia, China seems poised to continue working towards creation of a more stable and institutionalized security architecture.

Chinese diplomacy, aid, economic interactions and manifestations of soft power have increased the country’s influence in the South Pacific region. By some accounts, China’s influence is already approaching that of traditional stakeholders Australia and New Zealand. In Africa and other regions state-led and private activities in established powers’ perceived spheres of influence has caused concern and inspired particular narratives about China’s motivations. In this article we examine how media discourses in Australia and New Zealand have represented China’s role in the South Pacific. We find that China’s role has been constructed using multiple negative frames, which seek to establish China as unequivocally ‘different’. More than being unencumbered by the constraints of public opinion and a free press, China is portrayed as operating in a different moral universe, in which the cold hearted exploitation of vulnerable island nations (often in cahoots with venal island elites) is entirely normal. The article shows how such constructions reveal some of the complex issues involved in Australia and New Zealand’s relationships both with China and other South Pacific nations.

China’s impressive growth has been accompanied by huge rural-urban divide and social sacrifice of many including rural-urban migrants. Reflecting on the documentary Last Train Home (2009) by Lixin Fan, this paper identifies and examines the life of rural-urban migrants in China in terms of poverty-reduction, child-care, education and equal opportunities for a better life. By comparing the seemingly difficult and tragic life of the Zhang family against statistical facts, it shows that their suffering and struggles are common to most migrants. In essence, by creating an interactive dialogue between the film and the economic reality in China, this paper highlights the severe constraints on the Chinese peasantry and discusses the implications of limited choices and social injustice towards rural-urban migrants. It argues that the inequality in opportunities and the lack of social care for migrants has created huge social cleavage that not only reduces social welfare but may also impede further development.

The official narratives of Surrounding Areas in the 1997 New Guidelines are a curiosity: on the one hand, they signify Japan’s readiness to increase its international involvement, while on the other hand, the geographical designation remains vague despite Japan’s preoccupation with Asia. This suggests that Asia as Japan’s neighbourhood is considered along with international developments to facilitate the emergence of an ambiguous language for Japanese policy makers as they seek to adapt to changes in the international environment. As such, the term ‘Surrounding Areas’ signifies Tokyo’s anxieties in facing up to new challenges, as well as the willingness of the government to enhance Japan’s international role while maintaining its status as a pacifist state.