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Negotiating the recovery and resilience facility: the emergence of coordinative conditionality
Ladi S., Tsarouhas D., Copeland P.
Q1
AbstractThis paper analyses the design and negotiations of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs) which the EU member states were required to formulate so as to access the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). By focusing on three Eurozone members (Austria, Greece, and Slovakia) which represent distinct voices and experiences within the EU integration project, we argue that a new form of conditionality, coordinative conditionality, can be identified. While this conditionality shares many features with previous conditionality forms, it is also unique as it results from what has been described as coordinative Europeanisation, namely early coordination between the EU and member states; informal channels of communication alongside formal negotiations; and a heightened salience of ownership by national governments. We argue that although evidence of coordinative Europeanisation can be found during the design and negotiation of the NRRPs in all three countries, the intensity of conditionality’s different aspects is mediated by the credibility of a given member state’s government.
Voices unheard: How feelings of inefficacy fuel populism
Şimşek C.
Q1
AbstractHow do populist voters differ from other voters and among themselves? I argue that the commonality of populist voters is a perceived sense of political inefficacy. The feelings of inefficacy interact with grievances, which determine the party choice. Using the European Social Survey data, I show that when grievances are cultural, voters are more likely to vote for a right-wing populist party. In the same manner, economic grievances make left-wing populist voting more likely. Furthermore, I show that negative effect of political efficacy on populist voting declines as grievances become more severe. Thus, while grievances determine the type of populism, political efficacy determines the vote choice between populist parties and their alternatives.
Access, capacity and influence
Kühn N.S., Trondal J.
Q1
Different forms of integration into the European Union (EU) call for studies of the consequences of multilevel access structures. Similar to EU member-states, government officials from associated states interact closely with EU-level administrative institutions, notably the European Commission (Commission) and EU agencies. Benefiting from a large-N survey, this study demonstrates that bureaucrats from “third-countries”, such as Norway, may exert sectoral policy influence in the EU, and that organizational features of the public administration may systematically shape such patterns. The study offers two distinct contributions to the extant literature: First, it presents original survey data on how domestic agency officials perceive their influence vis-à-vis the EUs executive branch. Secondly, it probes the effects of two distinct drivers of policy influence—bureaucrats’ access to secondary structures and requisite administrative capacities.
Demographic deepening and far right durability: evidence from the Great Recession
Allen T.J.
Q1
Political scientists have largely situated Western Europe’s new far right in the noneconomic, sociocultural dimension of party competition that realized greater salience during the relative peace and affluence of the post-war period. Such an investment in ‘new politics’ implies that far right support should retrench when economic issues regain salience, yet far right support did not appreciably recede in the aftermath of Europe’s Great Recession. This article argues that far right durability during the Great Recession is due to a sociodemographically rooted electorate, defined by education, occupation, and working class identity, and that—among the major party families in Western Europe—the far right is uniquely and anachronistically structured by sociodemographics. Analyses using the European Election Study show that by 2014, far right parties exclusively overrepresent working class, blue collar, and less educated voters—even when compared to Social Democrats or the radical left. These voters appear unlikely to abandon the far right once they have lent support, and these traits predict future far right support even controlling for recalled vote. Thus, this article argues that far right success during the Great Recession results from consolidating rather than expanding their electoral base, with implications for democratic competition.
Foreign support does not mean sway for illiberal nationalist regimes: Putin sympathy, Russian influence, and Trump foreign policy in the Balkans
Fisher A., Hale H.E., Peshkopia R.
Q1
New information technologies increasingly allow autocrats to shape public opinion outside their borders. Regimes like Russia and China spend millions on such efforts, raising concerns that they may be swaying foreign publics through their illiberal nationalist appeals. We know little, though, about the actual impact of such endeavors. We ask here: Where such regimes can find foreign audiences who support them and the values they represent, does this translate into an ability to sway public opinion on important foreign policy issues through their endorsements? We focus on the Putin regime’s ability to shape orientations toward US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy through an experiment-bearing survey in two countries that share EU aspirations but have different baseline orientations to the USA and Russia: Serbia and Albania. We first establish that Putin has a considerable number of sympathizers in both countries and that this sympathy is indeed linked to illiberal nationalist ideas. We show, however, that these sympathies do not translate into an ability to move public opinion, and that where pro-American priors are strong, illiberal nationalist endorsement can actually backfire.
Who refuses ambiguity? Voters’ issue salience and the electoral effect of party position ambiguity
Han K.J.
Q1
Do political parties electorally benefit from presenting ambiguous policy positions? We suggest that the electoral effect of position ambiguity on an issue depends on the salience of the issue to voters. We use data on political parties’ party position, position ambiguity, and issue emphasis as well as survey data on voters’ issue salience. We find that ambiguous party positions on an issue weaken the electoral support of people who put salience on the issue. However, position ambiguity does not alter the electoral support of people who do not consider the issue salient. Our results imply that the electoral effect of position blurring in Western Europe should be understood in the context of party competition in multi-dimensional issue space. They also imply that political parties may face a dilemma between policy flexibility and electoral loss by presenting ambiguous party positions.
Aversion to far-left parties among Europeans voting abroad
Turcu A., Urbatsch R.
Q1
Recent increases in emigration and overseas voting have heightened the importance of understanding what characteristics predispose diaspora voters to support parties other than those most popular with domestic voters. We hypothesize such a divergence regarding far-left parties and test the issue positions and ideological traits that may inform it. Large-N analyses of an original cross-national dataset of European legislative election returns show that, as hypothesized, members of the far-left party family systematically receive smaller shares of the emigrant vote than of the domestic vote in both Eastern and Western European states’ elections. Still, the domestic–diaspora electoral rift is more accentuated in the East, where overseas voters are much less likely to support far-left parties than their Western European counterparts. Hostilities between ruling Communist parties and expatriate groups as well as different attitudes toward globalization and individualism may also explain this rift.
Incentivizing the Opposition: The EU’s Impact on Good Governance in Central and Eastern Europe
Kartal M.
Q1
Under what conditions does the European Union (EU) promote good governance? Focusing on the EU members in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), I present the first systematic analysis in the literature based on longitudinal data suggesting state performance varies across two indicators of governance: While there has been a general trend of backsliding in corruption control since EU accession, various time series analyses reveal no such tendency regarding ethnic minority rights. I argue that the EU has the ability to offer electoral incentives/opportunities to opposition parties in national legislatures to adopt pro-EU policy preferences, which pressures government parties to implement reforms demanded by the EU. Several statistical models suggest that such political leverage the EU has over national governments is a stronger explanation for the cross-issue variation than any other alternative in the literature including the popular ‘membership conditionality’ argument. More specifically, prior to membership, the EU offers electoral incentives to opposition parties in CEE and mobilizes them to pressure governments to fight corruption. Yet, following accession, parties move away from EU-induced policies. Regarding minority protection, pro-minority opposition parties empowered by the EU during candidacy continue to favor pro-minority policies after accession and push governments accordingly.
Understanding the identity of a policy field: the European Commission and liberal modernization in the domain of labour and social policy
Menz G.
Q1
In congruence with the theme of this special issue, this paper clarifies the contribution the identitarian turn in European Union (EU) studies can make to the field. The paper explores the policy domain identity of the European Union social and labour market policy. It argues that over time, this identity has shifted considerably. Starting in the 1990s, when the Delorsian re-regulatory policy orientation slowly dissipated in favour of a more market-oriented approach in line with the so-called pink turn of centrist Social Democratic parties, the identity has undergone a number of changes. In the 2000s, the predominant identity was clearly liberal in nature, shaped by the Lisbon Agenda and a faith in the welfare-creating powers of deregulated market capitalism. By the 2010s, there was clear pushback against this image, and throughout this decade, the policy domain identity has lingered and struggled to assume a more concrete orientation. This slightly muddled and unfocused identity is in part to blame for the period of stagnation in further strides, whilst criticism of Commission overreach and intra-EU immigration have created a momentum against additional activity in this field.
Comment: the EU and European identity
Fligstein N.
Q1
Affirming Europe with trade: deal negotiations and the making of a political identity
Duina F., Smith E.
Q1
Drawing from economic sociology, this article argues that trade liberalization is never devoid of cultural and symbolic content. As such, when pursued by international entities, it can help affirm collective identities. The EU Commission’s recent external trade negotiations with the USA (TTIP) and Canada (CETA) over food quality offer excellent examples. Pitting itself against North American neoliberalism and business-oriented commercialism, the Commission has championed a European understanding of food integrity and social responsibility. In so doing, it has also emphasized its role as the institution protective of European values on the world stage. Internally, the Commission’s pursuit of a digital single market has in parallel revealed a different approach. Here, the Commission has stressed the values of efficiency, the transcending of national borders, and consumer and business freedom. In that context, the Commission has presented itself as the political entity capable of advancing a dynamic and competitive vision of Europe. These differences point to the complexity associated with crafting ‘European’ values. They also point to preexisting domestic regulatory traditions in certain sectors as key factors influencing the Commission. We close by reflecting on the fact that the Commission’s rhetoric has not gone unchallenged externally or internally.
Is differentiation possible in rule of law?
Kelemen R.D.
Q1
The European Union (EU) is a community based on the rule of law. EU member states have committed themselves to uphold the rule of law and to respect the primacy of EU law. Yet today, the EU legal order is threatened by the emergence of increasingly autocratic member state governments, particularly those in Hungary and Poland, who routinely violate the fundamental rule of law principles on which the EU is based. This article assesses whether the model of differentiated integration can be applied to help the EU address this rule of law crisis. In recent years, many analysts have called on the EU to embrace a model of differentiated integration as a way to address its many challenges, and some have suggested that versions of differentiation might help the EU resolve tensions with its member states concerning the rule of law. By contrast, this article will argue that differentiation in the rule of law and the theory of constitutional pluralism that some use to justify it are neither normatively desirable nor practically feasible models. In short, we must reject differentiated integration when it comes to rule of law.
The future of differentiated integration: a ‘soft-core,’ multi-clustered Europe of overlapping policy communities
Schmidt V.A.
Q1
In lieu of a conclusion to the Special Issue, this article discusses the future of Europe as one of differentiated integration. It argues that this future takes the form of member-states’ overlapping participation in the EU’s many policy communities, making for a soft-core Europe, as an alternative option to the hard-core around the Eurozone. The article contends that this multi-clustered Europe is the only feasible future, given the challenges facing the EU from its many crises, its problems of governance, and the difficulties of decision-making against a background of increasing politicization. But such differentiation is not without its problems, given EU decision-rules, the interconnectedness of policy arenas that can spell problems of spillover, and the need for deeper integration in some policy areas (e.g., migration) while others may benefit from less or more highly differentiated integration (e.g., Eurozone). Institutional reforms would also be necessary to ensure a positive future of differentiated integration: While the EU would continue to require a single set of institutions, it would need modified decision-rules to allow for more (and less) differentiation depending upon the area.
Differentiation in security and defence policy
Howorth J.
Q1
This paper first assesses the salience of academic theories in the realm of security and defense policy, from the fields of both International Relations and European Studies. Theory is of relatively little assistance in understanding the phenomenon of a strictly—or even autonomously—European Union foreign and defence policy—in part precisely because of what I call negative differentiation. The second part homes in on the empirical reality of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In this particular policy area, differentiation has always been the norm, or the negative starting point—rather than a developing trend or a potential solution. The third part evaluates the current (post-2016) “re-launch” of CSDP and the widely discussed dynamic behind the EU’s quest for “strategic autonomy”. This section analyses the depth and sustainability behind what is widely seen as a new attempt either to break away from or to positively embrace differentiation and to engineer an unprecedented marshalling of the collective security and defense resources of the European Union.
EU migration policy and border controls: from chaotic to cohesive differentiation
Chebel d’Appollonia A.
Q1
The EU’s migration policy is comprised of a series of initiatives, agreements, regulations, and common standards in various fields—involving different states that participate to different degrees while attempting to address common issues. The resulting complex multilayered framework is commonly analyzed from two opposing perspectives about the continued differentiated integration of the EU and its member states. The first one focuses on issues raised by the chaotic nature of flexible arrangements or an “à la carte” integration in the field of migration. From this perspective, differentiated integration is symptomatic of an existential crisis fueled by EU states unwilling to move toward an “ever closer union.” The second perspective, in contrast, refers to differentiation in migration policy as the inevitable model of differentiated integration in other policy areas—based on the revival of coalition building as a tool of governance in a multispeed Europe. From this perspective, differentiated integration is legitimized as the most effective remedy to prevent the risk of disintegration. The article provides a critical evaluation of differentiated integration in order to analyze the implications of the still unfolding migration crisis. Its aim is to identify a more feasible—and ideally more ethical—institutional system of “cohesive differentiation.”
Ever tighter union? Brexit, Grexit, and frustrated differentiation in the single market and Eurozone
Matthijs M., Parsons C., Toenshoff C.
Q1
Many European political leaders and observers have argued that the European Union’s multiple recent challenges call for more “differentiated integration.” At first glance, the EU may seem to lend itself quite well to such an approach, with already variegated memberships in the Euro area or Schengen borderless travel zone. What proponents of differentiation tend to overlook, however, is that the Union’s core commitments are not set up to permit much internal variation at all. Indeed, in the EU’s two flagship policy areas—the Single Market and the Eurozone—the defining institutional principles rule out differentiation to a striking degree. To substantiate this claim, we show that the rules in these areas are considerably more constraining of EU member states than are analogous federal constraints within the USA. We then highlight how these tightly limiting principles of EU economic governance have shaped recent negotiations with Greece in the Eurozone and the UK in the Single Market. While the EU’s core constraining principles make calls for differentiation all the more comprehensible, they also underscore that differentiated options may require rather fundamental change to the current institutional status quo.
Introduction: differentiation and beyond
Fabbrini S., Schmidt V.A.
Q1
After the crisis: political protest in the aftermath of the economic recession
Vassallo F.
Q1
Economic recessions have often led to stronger citizen activism. This article assesses the relationship between the economy and protest in 2014, 6 years after the global financial crisis took place, a long-enough period for countries to have improved their economic situation and for people’s interpretations of the economy to be more optimistic. Does the economy still matter to explain protest if it is not as salient any longer? This research employs data for available European Union member states from the 2006, 2008, and 2014 European Social Survey to test the importance of national-level objective economic indicators as well as individual-level evaluations of financial well-being. Findings from the research suggest that objective economic predictors are more relevant to understand protest in 2014 than before the crisis. Economic resources remain more important for the prediction of protest than deprivation views, with the exception of unemployment. Even at times of partial economic recovery, the state of the economy helps explain increased levels of political protest across Europe well after 2008. The link between the economy and confrontational activism before and after the economic recession looks in the end very similar and a full economic recovery in the future can lead to even more protest activism in Europe.
National liberalisms in a neoliberal age: ideas and economic adjustment in contemporary France and Germany
Vail M.I.
Q1
In contrast to prevailing claims of neoliberal hegemony, this article argues that French and German trajectories of adjustment have diverged from standard neoliberal recipes in important ways. France has accompanied liberalization with macroeconomically oriented measures designed to bolster aggregate demand, while Germany has imposed the burden of reform on outsiders while shielding insiders from the costs of adjustment. This article argues that differences in French and German policy trajectories are informed by distinctive national liberalisms—‘statist liberalism’ in the French case and ‘corporate liberalism’ in Germany—that entail divergent models of state intervention, social organization, and political accountability, while rejecting standard neoliberal prescriptions. It develops these claims through an analysis of French and German labour-market reforms in the 1990s and 2000s and policy responses to the post-2007 crisis. It argues that a focus on the political power of ideas is crucial for understanding broad national adjustment strategies across institutional, policy, and partisan contexts.
Examining the causes of government-based discrimination against religious minorities in western democracies: societal-level discrimination and securitization
Fox J., Finke R., Eisenstein M.A.
Q1
This study examines the causes of government-based religious discrimination (GRD) against religious minorities in Western democracies. We focus on two causes. First securitization theory posits minorities which are perceived as security threats are more likely to attract GRD. Second, many posit that GRD has its origin in societal discrimination (SRD) and prejudices. We test these theories using new data from the Religion and State-Minorities round 3 dataset (RASM3) which includes 116 religious minorities in 26 Western democracies. Our findings support securitization theory’s predictions, but this result pertains mostly to Muslims because they constitute most minorities in Western Democracies which engage in violence against the majority religion, thereby posing a security threat. Similarly, the theorized relationship between SRD and GRD holds only for Muslim minorities which we posit is due to their securitization.
The EU’s maritime operations and the future of European Security: learning from operations Atalanta and Sophia
Dombrowski P., Reich S.
Q1
The study of maritime operations has generally been neglected in a European Security and Defense Policy debate that often focuses on political will, bureaucratic incoherence, and military interoperability. Nonetheless, maritime operations have played an increasingly important role in the last decade and deserve deeper analysis. First, they provide a valuable optic for identifying a dynamic change in policy priorities over time. Second, they suggest the conditions under which the EU can and cannot fulfill the Brussels leadership’s avowed role as a “global player.” Finally, they also illustrate the EU’s presiding tensions when it comes to external challenges: between rhetoric and behavior, institutionally with NATO, and of the shifting political priorities among national governments. In this article, we compare the EU’s two major maritime operations. The first, Atalanta, is a counter-piracy multilateral operation in cooperation with NATO and non-EU states off the Somali coast. The second, Sophia, has evolved from search and rescue to thwarting migrant flows in the Mediterranean. Among several conclusions, we suggest that the evolution of maritime operations demonstrates an increasing gap—between the EU’s rhetoric of having a global strategy and its regional operational security focus.
Gender, crisis and the welfare state: Female labor market outcomes across OECD countries
Kushi S., McManus I.P.
Q1
The 2008 global economic crisis has had profound social and economic consequences across states. In addition to cross-national social and economic disparities, the crisis generated increased domestic divisions between labor market insider and outsider groups. This article analyzes the impact of the global economic crisis on female workers across advanced welfare states. While considerable attention has been given to the impact of the Great Recession on financial markets and employment sectors, we argue that the crisis had an important gendered effect across advanced capitalist states that remains significantly underexplored. In particular, we examine the divergent ways in which distinct welfare systems and their cultural underpinnings shape labor market access and levels of social protection for women. In this endeavor, we integrate literature on welfare systems, feminist political economy and financial crisis to examine the relationship between social protection structures, cultural legacies and gender inequalities – which manifests most strongly during times of economic crisis. Our hierarchical panel model of 28 countries across 7 years is supplemented by cultural and survey data. Our findings not only give an important analysis of an understudied aspect of the global economic crisis, but also provide policy implications for more gender-conscious crisis management responses going forward.
The conditioning effect of EU membership status: understanding compliance with legislative initiatives to protect trafficking victims
Stobb M., McDonald C.
Q1
European countries face a tremendous challenge in coping with human trafficking, a challenge that has been exacerbated by the increase in irregular forms of migration to Europe since 2015. European Union members have made progress in developing a legal framework to protect trafficking victims. Yet attempts to coordinate national laws fail to address the growing problem. Research is needed to understand why states fall short of EU goals. Through case studies of Germany, Hungary and Turkey, we examine the extent to which adoption of the European Union’s Council Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings is associated with positive domestic changes. We focus on the effect of European Union membership status on implementation of victim protection policy. The results suggest that powerful EU members need incentives to cooperate that exceed costs, while capacity-building measures would likely drive change for candidates and newer members. Our findings help scholars predict when European legislative initiatives will likely translate into better domestic anti-trafficking measures. The findings also have broader implications for cooperative efforts in migration control and human rights protection.
What to expect when you’re electing: the relationship between far-right strength and citizenship policy in Europe
Hansen M.A., Clemens J.L.
Q1
The analysis builds on previous research exploring the impact of far-right support on citizenship policy. Using Bayesian analyses, this research evaluates the impact of far-right success on citizenship policy restrictiveness and citizenship policy outcomes per year across 29 European countries between 2003–2014. Results reveal that far-right success is a statistically and substantively significant factor in determining citizenship policy restrictiveness as well as rates of naturalization. However, differential levels of impact suggest that far-right influence is not uniform throughout the policy process.
